But what about this notion of "instilling beliefs" and it's relation to belief formation? TBS doesn't use the word, but it sounds like this is what he's getting at...or something like it.
Beliefs aren't "put" in us. Beliefs aren't "done" to us. That's not what it is for our cognitive faculties to function properly.
Beliefs are "had" (properly basic beliefs) or they are "reasoned to" from other beliefs/seemings.
See http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4OqJbrwcHtoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=Warrant+and+Proper+Function&ots=h9ltskvopI&sig=Op-ZPFqtV8XwMOU6WyAU4An9OfI -- a part of a book by Alvin Plantinga where he talks about warrant and the proper function of our cognitive faculties.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zg0hePsvyxU -- Veritas48's video on warrant and Christian Belief.
Here's what I mean by 'seemings':
On simple seeing: "If one sees a red apple, then one has a sensation-of-red, i.e., is appeared to in a red-type way." (J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig from "Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview")
On seeming: ...there are cognitive intuitions "...and these divide into doxastic, which are beliefs, and non-doxastic, which are seemings. Both are cognitive in having propositional objects." (Robert Audi giving a lecture at Notre Dame)
What I'm getting at is that it is possible that people have knowledge without believing a *proposition*. Of course the knowledge would have to be propositionalizable, but it doesn't have to be a belief in a proposition.
But still, even with this revision, TBS's argument can still be made:
1. If God hasn't actualized states of affairs whereby all peoples of all times, by means of their cognitive faculties functioning properly, come to accept the set of beliefs necessary to keeping out of hell, and whereby time is allowed after accepting that set for people to reject that set, then God does not exist.
2. God hasn't actualized states of affairs whereby all peoples of all times, by means of their cognitive faculties functioning properly, come to accept the set of beliefs necessary to keeping out of hell, and whereby time is allowed after accepting that set for people to reject that set.
3. Therefore, God does not exist. (MP 1, 2)
So what we have with these revisions is this:
-T1 (where people find themselves in a position to reason to and acquire knowledge of the right set of beliefs)
-Knowledge of that right set of beliefs
-T2 (where people have time to freely reject the right set of beliefs they believe)
Before responding, I look again at the set of necessary and sufficient beliefs for keeping out of hell that I proposed in my last video and revise some of them:
(i) People willfully malfunction.
(ii) God exists and brought about the existence of everything besides himself.
(iii) God has provided a means to proper function for all those who have willfully malfunction.
I respond to TBS's argument by saying that, at some point before every person dies, every person will believe (i)-(iii). I deny (2) of TBS's argument as I've reformulated it. (See Romans 1:18-32)
Notice how TBS's saying, "I don't believe, therefore God doesn't exist" is now made obsolete. Who knows, maybe TBS has believed (has had knowledge) in the past, but has now rejected it (knowledge does not negate freedom of the will!) and convinced himself that he never had true belief or never had those experiences. Maybe TBS never has had this knowledge, but one day will. I don't know!
Consider the solipsist: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solopism
No matter whose right here, we can still proceed by rationalizing and discussion these things!
See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=debates_main -- a list of debates between a theist and many different atheists as an example.
We also each have access to each others stories/narratives.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Divorce - a wikipedia article on "The Great Divorce"
http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100311.txt - "The Everlasting Man" complete online book!
Tags: Theoretical Bullshit John Forcey God freewill hell Hiddenness knowledge arguments stories narratives